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Abstract  
This paper investigates the impact of green public procurement (governments’ purchases) of 
certified wood in the EU. A spatial partial price equilibrium model is developed to analyse 
whether this policy impacts interregional trade flows of wood and other regions’ economic 
welfare. The model contains an innovative feature which allows the introduction of 
consumers’ willingness to pay for certified wood, and producers’ willingness to accept 
certified wood production in order to determine the share of certified wood in consumption 
and demand. The outcome of the analysis demonstrates that green public procurement of 
certified wood in one region can create a trade barrier for other regions and decrease other 
regions’ economic welfare. In the worst case scenario, other regions’ production of non-
certified wood even increases. This endangers forest conservation. Cost reductions and 
adequate financial compensation for certified wood producers can tackle these problems. 
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Introduction, scope and main objectives 
This paper considers the conjoint effect of two instruments which aim to sustain the production 
and consumption of wood. The two instruments’ impact is analysed at global level by making 
use of a Spatial Partial Equilibrium Model. This model links different regions’ wood markets 
through trade. The characteristics of the two policy instruments require the introduction of an 
innovative feature to the traditional models.  
The first instrument is forest certification. Forest certification is a transnational, non-
governmental approach to environmental regulation and development. In the past, traditional 
conservation interventions such as international forest conservation agreements, national 
forest policy reform, and the creation of additional protected areas were not able to 
significantly reduce unsustainable logging in tropical forests (Auld, et al. 2008). This was 
partly because the governments responsible for the tropical forests lack the capacity to 
adequately manage natural resources and enforce pertinent forestry and land-use regulations 
(Ebeling & Yasué 2009, Kramer, et al. 1997) and to provide secure land tenure (Smith, et al. 
2003). Market-based instruments involving non state actors, such as certification, depend less 
on public resources and governance capacity. Consequently, certification is promoted as 
economically attractive alternative and potentially more effective in tropical developing 
countries during the two last decades (Auld, Gulbrandsen & McDermott 2008, Gullison 
2003). But certification does not yet positively affects forest management in countries with 
weak governance capacities. Nearly 90 percent of the FSC and PEFC (the two main 
certification schemes) certified forests are situated in the northern hemisphere. In contrast, 
only 2 percent of under-regulated southern tropical forest is certified. 
  
The second instrument is Green Public Procurement (GPP). GPP refers to public procurement 
processes which take environmental aspects into account. At the supply side of the market, 
GPP encourages industries to develop green technologies and practices (Erdmenger 2003, 
European Commission 2011). At the demand side, GPP became a promising tool to foster the 
demand for greener products (Parikka-Alhola 2008). 
Problem statement and research question 
This paper assumes that if governments opt for GPP, they will buy certified wood (products) 
only. But ‘forest industries in different countries are increasingly linked through international 
trade and global environmental policies’ (Buongiorno 2003). Gan and McCarl (2007) for 
example demonstrated how production decisions in one continent induce output reactions in 
other continents. Also Sedjo and Sohngen (2013) (1999) (1995) described the global 
consequences of regional forest policies. Hence, the implementation of GPP of certified wood 
in one region can impact other regions’ wood markets. Spatial Partial Equilibrium Models 
(SEMs) take this international aspect into account. Takayama and Judge (1971) first 
developed the SEM approach. SEMs distinguish supply and demand functions per region and 
determine prices, demand, and supply per region as well as bilateral trade flows. This allows 
to investigate the impact of policies on the welfare of consumers and producers separately.  
The characteristics of the proposed policy require the introduction of an innovative feature to 
traditional SEMs. Governments will only buy certified products. Consequently, certified 
supply and demand must be distinguished from conventional supply and demand. This is 
done by introducing the Willingness to Pay for and Willingness to Accept certified products.  
The SEM takes 5 regions into account: Europe & Russia, Northern America, Latin America, 
Asia & Oceania, and Africa. Only ‘industrial roundwood’ is considered in the SEM. The 
other wood products are taken into account indirectly. This research makes use of the data by 
Buongiorno (2003) in order to determine the demand for industrial roundwood in the baseline 
situation. In the work of Buongiorno (2003) this demand is partially determined by the 
demand for industrial roundwood as input for the production of other wood products (e.g. 
sawnwood, plywood, particleboards, fiberwood). 
Model description 
In traditional SEMs, no distinction is made between certified and conventional products. 
Therefore, a new SEM is developed. The specification of the supply and demand functions 
per region i is the first step in the development of the SEM. This allows the calculation of the 
traditional economic welfare per region. The regional economic welfare consists of the sum 
of the consumer surplus and producer surplus. These surpluses depend on the supply price 
and demand price and accompanying supplied and demanded quantities. Figure 1 visualises 
the economic welfare for an open market.  
  
 
Figure 1: Economic welfare calculation 
Economic Welfare: Consumer Surplus + Producer Surplus. Consumer Surplus = area ABD. Producer Surplus = area 
0BC  
In this paper, the regional demanded and supplied quantities (  and ) are determined by 
allowing the baseline demand and supply (  and ) to respond to price changes. The 
baseline prices (  and ) attain new price levels ( and ) due to the introduction of 
certification. The price elasticity of demand and supply (  and ) determine the 
responsiveness of the supplied and demanded quantities to the price changes: 
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        2 
The demand and supply functions described above encompass the demand and supply of both 
certified and conventional wood. The second step of the SEM’s development aims to 
distinguish conventional and certified wood. The share of certified wood in the aggregate 
demand and supply is determined by making use of the WTP and WTA. 
Willingness To Pay – Willingness To Accept 
The WTP expresses the maximum price premium consumers are willing to pay for certified 
wood. Cai and Aguilar (2013) conducted a meta-analysis on the consumers’ WTP for 
certified wood products. They found a mean WTP for wood products of 12.8% on top of the 
conventional wood price (St. Dev. 0.08). This research assumes regional differences in WTP. 
Jacobsen and Hanley (2009) developed a logistic regression model which demonstrated that 
the WTP for eco-labels and ecosystem services is positively related to GDP per capita. 
Hence, ‘Willingness to Pay’ is probably a wrong choice of words. Instead it reflects the 
‘Capacity to Pay’. The model by Jacobsen and Hanley (2009) is used in order to determine 
the mean WTP per continent based upon the overall average WTP found by Cai and Aguilar 
(2013).  
The WTA is the WTP’s equivalent at the supply side of the market. The WTA represents the 
minimum price premium requested by wood producers before they switch from conventional 
to certified production. This price premium must compensate the additional direct and 
indirect costs related to certification. The certification bodies declare that wood producers 
  
receive price premiums between 15 to 25 % on top of the conventional wood price. This 
allows to determine the WTA per region by combining the standardised distribution with the 
share of certified forests in the total forest area per continent derived from UNECE/FAO 
(2014).  
The WTA is higher in developing countries than in developed countries for two reasons. 
First, ‘the magnitude of the indirect costs depend upon the current quality of the management 
of conventional forests and the context in which forestry is taking place’ (Gullison 2003, 
ITTC 2004). Because current management techniques in developing countries are less 
appropriate for certification, their producers demonstrate higher WTA. Second, only a small 
part of certification costs are variable costs. Consequently, certification costs are easier to 
bear for bigger producers. Large scale producers are generally more present in developed 
countries.  
Both the WTP and WTA are introduced in the model as parameters and will be used in order 
to determine the share of certified wood in demand and wood (  and 
). Because it is assumed that the WTP and WTA follow a standardised 
distribution with known mean and standard deviation, the share of certified demand and 
supply can be determined for each price premium. Figure 2 and Figure 3 display this 
reasoning for a given price premium.  
From these figures it becomes apparent that traditional welfare calculation is not sufficient 
for a market which is characterised by the presence of certified products. At the demand side 
of the market, some of the consumers buying certified goods at a given market price premium 
might be willing to pay higher price premiums. The shaded area in Figure 2 represents the 
additional consumer surplus related to the introduction of price premiums in the model. 
Accordingly, the shaded area in Figure 3 represents the additional producer surplus. 
Since the WTP is assumed to be standardly distributed, the WTP function can be described 
by the following equation:  
     3 
The integral of this function from the equilibrium WTP to infinity equals the consumer 
surplus related to the distribution of the WTP:  
       4 
Accordingly, the producer surplus ( ) related to the distribution of the WTA is calculated: 
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The  and  related to the price premium are multiplied with the equilibrium price and 
equilibrium quantity for the aggregate demand and supply before being added to the 
traditional welfare calculation.  
  
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of the WTP, accompanying share 
of certified wood in total consumption per price 
premium  
Figure 3: Distribution of the WTA, accompanying share 
of certified wood in total production per price premium 
Welfare calculation 
The new SEM maximises global welfare defined as: 
             7 
This equation contains the traditional consumer and producers surplus in the first two 
summations. The integral of the supply and demand functions are calculated to come to the 
consumer and producer surplus for each region. The 3rd to the 5th summation are the costs 
related to the interregional transport of wood. Those costs decrease the global economic 
surplus. Value added taxes and transport costs from region i to region j are taken into account 
as costs related to trade. The final summations represent the extension to traditional welfare 
calculation. They add the consumer and producer surplus related to the distribution of the 
WTP and WTA to the welfare calculations. 
Global consequences of GPP of certified wood in the EU 
In the EU, the aggregated share of all governments in final consumption is 26.8% 
(EUROSTAT 2014). The SEM introduces the GPP of certified wood by modifying equation 
3 into: 
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In this equation,  stands for the share of the government in final consumption and thus 
the potential share of demand reserved for certified wood due to GPP. In the SEM, parameter 
 is set at 0.268.  
Welfare implication 
The global welfare increased by 1.31 % due to GPP of certified wood in the Europe & 
Russia. This should not come as a surprise. If governments opt for the cheapest type of wood 
– conventional wood – they prevent their economy from benefitting from its full economic 
welfare potential. Since the share of certified wood in consumption cannot encompass the 
share of the government in final consumption, producers cannot benefit from the producer 
surplus related to this demand. This does not imply that the economic welfare will increase 
under all circumstances if governments opt for GPP. It implies that this is possible.  
Figure 4 presents the percentage change of the regional welfare per region. Two regions are 
confronted with a decreasing economic welfare: Latin America and Asia &Oceania. The 
economic welfare of the other regions increased.  
 
Figure 4: Change of the regional welfare due to GPP in Europe & Russia 
All regions’ producers – except in Africa – are worse off. This is a result of the global 
decreased demand for wood. In most regions – except in Africa – the price for wood also 
decreased, leading to an even smaller producer surplus. The increased producer surplus in 
Africa is a bit exceptional. Unfortunately, this increase relates to an increased production of 
conventional wood which are sold at higher prices.  
Consumers surpluses generally increased due to lower prices of conventional wood. The 
certified wood price increased moderately. This is positive for consumers, but can be 
negative for producers. Hence, for the share of certified wood producers this decreasing 
conventional wood price is compensated by an increasing price premium. This price premium 
is received on top of the decreasing conventional wood price. But only part of the producers 
benefit from this increasing price premium. Consequently, the overall producer surplus still 
decreased in all regions – except for the African producers. 
Trade implications 
On a global level, trade of wood increased by 9.25 % after the GPP in the Europe & Russia. 
Surprisingly, this is due to increasing international trade flows of conventional wood. The 
quantity of traded certified wood decreased considerably. Most regions fulfil their own 
  
demand for certified wood. Only Europe & Russia imports certified wood. But imports of 
certified wood in this region only accounts for 1.1 % of certified consumption. Only Africa 
and Northern America are exporting certified wood. Before GPP, all regions where exporting 
certified wood. Exports of conventional wood increased on global level. It are Africa, Latin 
America, and Northern America which are exporting conventional wood. Asia & Oceania is 
receiving most of this wood. This region imports 17.8 % of its conventional wood needs.  
This analysis demonstrates that GPP of certified wood excluded some producers from the 
international wood market. Hence, the policy created a trade barrier in favour of domestically 
produced certified wood. In addition, the growing demand for certified products in Europe & 
Russia resulted in an increasing production of conventional wood in Africa. Also the global 
consumption of conventional products increased as these products now became cheaper. A 
contradictory outcome of the initial policy’s goal.  
The trends described by the SEM are also observed in reality by Auld, Gulbrandsen and 
McDermott (2008). Simula, et al. (2004) even warn for the problematic implications of this 
development: if ‘producers are forced to drop out from traditional markets as has already 
happened in some cases, product prices are driven down. Simula, Astana, Ishmael, Santana 
and Schmidt (2004) share this opinion and claim that without ‘tangible benefits deriving from 
certification in terms of profitability or competitiveness, enterprises will have little incentive 
to improve forest management with higher costs. The problem is particularly serious in the 
case of tropical timber producing countries’. The results of our SEM seem to confirm this 
statement. 
Conclusion and policy recommendation 
The GPP of certified wood in the EU has global consequences. Surprisingly, some of the 
results of GPP are contradictory to the initial goal of the policy. In Africa, the production of 
certified wood declined and global trade of certified wood decreased. GPP created a trade 
barrier for certified wood. Obviously, the developed SEM has its limitations and must not be 
used for precise forecasting. Nevertheless it describes the mechanisms leading to a potentially 
negative outcome of GPP of certified wood.  
The SEM finds small shares of certified wood in the supply of wood in the continents below 
the equator. This is also observed in reality: only 2 percent of the tropical forests is certified 
at present (Dauvergne & Lister 2013). This suggests that certification costs are higher than 
the received price premium for most producers in the tropical region. Government policies 
could aim to reduce certification costs. The certification cost depends upon several factors: 
the legislative framework in support of certification (Putz, et al. 2000), the level of vertical 
integration of the forest industry along the production chain (Atyi & Simula 2002), the 
distance certifiers have to travel (Gullison 2003), the available financial means (ITTC 2004), 
and the size of the forest (Ebeling & Yasué 2009). The costs are relatively low for large-scale 
producers and relatively high for small-scale producers (Gullison 2003). In addition, large-
scale wood producers are also favoured over small-scale wood producers by the buyers of 
certified wood. Demand for certified wood is mainly driven by retail which demands large 
volumes, uniform physical quality, and low prices. Large-scale wood producers are better 
able to meet these requirements (Klooster 2005, Molnar & Trends 2003, Rametsteiner & 
Simula 2003, Taylor 2005). Because large-scale producers and operators are more present in 
the Northern hemisphere, the average certification cost in this hemisphere also has the 
tendency to be lower. Producers in the Southern hemisphere could be assisted in their 
certification process. If this assistance decreases the costs of certification, it is more likely 
that the share of certified wood producers in these areas increases. According to Simula, 
  
Astana, Ishmael, Santana and Schmidt (2004), a phased approach is required. In addition, a 
comprehensive strategy must be developed in which certification plays a complementary role 
in sustainable forest management. 
Besides working on the costs of non-certified producers, it is also worthwhile to look at the 
price premium received for certified wood. In reality, producers hardly receive a price 
premium. Retailers are the most powerful actors in wood commodity chains, and they have 
little interest in either increasing the cost of the products to consumers or in passing any 
increased revenue back to their certified suppliers (Bass 2001, Klooster 2005, Madrid & 
Chapela 2003, Morris & Dunne 2004, Taylor 2005). Nevertheless, price premiums and an 
increased or protected market share are the main motivation for certification (Simula, Astana, 
Ishmael, Santana & Schmidt 2004)1. 
The views expressed in this information product are those of the author(s) and do not 
necessarily reflect the views or policies of FAO.  
                                                          
1 Although also indirect costs can be significant.  
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